Licensing
interim R&D knowledge |
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Yossi
Spiegel, Tel Aviv University |
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Current
version: July 2008 |
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Abstract: This
paper considers three firms that engage in a winner-takes-all R&D contest
to develop a new technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm
that has the highest probability of success is better-off licensing or
selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms
or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although such transfer of
interim R&D knowledge erodes the technological lead of the leading
firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create
value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new
technology when the leading firm fails. |
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Keywords:
Interim
R&D knowledge, exclusive and nonexclusive licensing, transfer of knowledge,
cross-licensing
JEL
Classification Numbers: D45, O32 |
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Slides |
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Last updated: July 11, 2008 |