Can we ever feel at home?


Numerous terms that attempt to categorize various generations according to their technological and/or digital affiliations have been coined. Within the educational internet, Marc Prensky's 2001 distinction of digital immigrants versus digital natives, apparently first used (by him) in a 2001 article of that same name, has become a popular, almost meme-like, means of distinguishing between those born into the digital age and those whose primary means of interacting with information is via ink on paper. Prensky doesn't pull punches. He wants us to realize just how different those of us from earlier generations are from those born into digitality:
It is now clear that as a result of this ubiquitous environment and the sheer volume of their interaction with it, today's students think and process information fundamentally differently from their predecessors. These differences go far further and deeper than most educators suspect or realize. "Different kinds of experiences lead to different brain structures, "says Dr. Bruce D. Berry of Baylor College of Medicine. As we shall see in the next installment, it is very likely that our students’ brains have physically changed - and are different from ours - as a result of how they grew up. But whether or not this is literally true, we can say with certainty that their thinking patterns have changed.
Reading that brains have physically changed in such a short period of time causes me to raise an eyebrow. (And I'm neither the only, nor the first, to wonder whether this is a correct, or useful, metaphor.) But not being an authority on what leads to the development of various brain structures (far from it!), I have no reason not to defer to Dr. Berry's expertise on the subject. If he says that experience affects those structures, so be it. Still, telling us that "the sheer volume" of interaction with the digital environment causes today's students to "think and process information fundamentally differently" seems little more than headline catching hyperbole.

Prensky is probably aware that, enticing as his claims might be, not everyone is going to be convinced. This is probably the reason that the second part of Prensky's article (published two months after the first part) attempts to establish an empirical basis for the claim of structural change in the brain. Prensky offers quite a number of references to back up his claim. Again, I'm far from an expert, but it's hard not to get the impression that just about anything and everything that he's encountered that might somehow suggest something along the lines of what he wants to show gets a footnote in order to strengthen his argument. An examination of those footnotes, for instance, shows that at least a couple of them come from the promotional publications of a New York financial consultancy firm. What can I say? Though I'm a firm believer that someone doesn't need to have a PhD attached to his or her name in order to be considered an expert, when it comes to brain science, I tend to prefer something a bit more academic.



Go to: Carrying cognitive baggage from the old country